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International Law Making and Implementation
Today we confront a critical environmental challenge: 
how to protect the human environment for ourselves and 
future generations in the face of our unprecedented capacity 
to alter fundamental physical cycles with global and long-
range implications for the robustness of our planet. 
Scientists observe that we are leaving the stable 
Holocene Epoch, embarking on a new geological epoch, 
the Anthropocene, in which humans are the major force 
for change to the planet.1 There is evidence that the 
fundamental carbon and nitrogen cycles are accelerating 
significantly, and that the hydrological cycle is speeding 
up. The latter can lead to devastating impacts from 
more frequent and intense storms, floods and severe 
droughts. These developments inherently raise issues of 
intergenerational equity. 
Environmental law must play an important role in this 
emerging epoch. We need environmental law to help ensure 
that those living today protect the robustness and integrity 
of our planet. We also need it to protect the interests of 
future generations so that they can receive a planet no worse 
off, on balance, than it was when we received it. This is 
a big challenge for a field of law that has had little more 
than 40 years in which to develop.
This challenge is taking place within the context 
of what may be called a kaleidoscopic world. States, 
of which there are now more than 195, continue to 
have a central role in the international system. But in 
addition, thousands of international organisations (inter-
governmental and non-governmental), multinational and 
national corporations, innumerable networks and informal 
or transient groups, a myriad of community groups 
and, recently, millions of individuals also participate in 
formulating and implementing environmental norms. 
Because of developments in information technology, 
changes can take place rapidly, and often unexpectedly. 
New patterns of interaction emerge.
People communicate regularly by cell phone, Twitter, 
Facebook, YouTube, blogs, etc., locally and across the 
globe.2 In the first quarter of 2013, Facebook reported 
1,110,000,000 users, with Asia accounting for 319 million, 
and Europe 269 million.3 The social network VK, a 
Cyrillic-based social network, reportedly had about 199 
million users as of May 2012.4 Studies report that Twitter 
has almost 556 million registered accounts, with an average 
of 58 million tweets per day.5 YouTube, as of June 2012, 
tallied more than one billion unique users each month and 
globally 25 percent of the video footage that is watched is 
coming from mobile devices.6 Blogs are also numerous and 
are influential sources of opinion. As of June 2013, data 
on top blog-hosting sites provide the following numbers 
on blogs and estimates of daily use: Wordpress had 66.7 
million blogs, with 382 million daily visitors; Tumblr had 
113.7 million blogs with almost 40 million daily visitors; 
and LiveJournal had 64.9 million blogs with almost 3.7 
million daily visitors.7 These numbers increase monthly. 
Google’s blogger (which includes the former blogspot) 
does not report the number of blogs that it hosts.
In addition, the number of cell phones in use has grown 
dramatically, especially in India, south-east Asia, and 
Africa. In India, for example, wireless phone subscriptions 
reached 867.02 million in April 2013,8 and in Africa, 
mobile phone subscriptions grew from 16.5 million in 
2000 to 648.4 million in 2011.9 These data indicate that 
information technology is transforming the way that 
people interact and the ways in which individuals, ad hoc 
groups, and others can influence events and take actions. 
Governments have also signed on to the new technology, 
with 125 national governments using Twitter, as of July 
2012.10 
With the new information technology, there are 
potentially many more active participants contributing 
to shaping the development and implementation of 
environmental law. While some of these actors could work 
against environmental conservation, there is at the same 
time new space for initiatives and for cooperative efforts 
that work toward sustainable development. Many may take 
the form of voluntary commitments.
Environmental law, which for these purposes references 
international environmental law, has a critical role in 
this emerging setting of an Anthropocene epoch and a 
kaleidoscopic world. Importantly, environmental law 
shapes our behaviour. It provides predictability as to 
what is expected and thereby contributes to the stability 
of political and social systems. At the same time, it can 
protect the dignity of individuals in the environment and 
foster environmental justice. Environmental law reflects 
shared values and articulates rules that reflect them. While 
traditionally, international environmental agreements 
have reflected such shared values and articulated  the 
common obligations that penetrated within States, in 
the kaleidoscopic world, shared values will also have to 
flourish from the bottom up so that actions taken by the 
myriad of new actors work toward common ends. 
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Traditional Ways of Making International 
Environmental Law
Historically, States have made international law by 
entering into binding agreements, which they are then 
required to implement within their countries. Those within 
the country are expected to comply with national laws 
and regulations implementing the agreement or, in some 
countries, directly with the international obligations to 
which their governments have agreed. The relationship 
between States is horizontal and, within States, hierarchical.
In the decade and a half following the historic United 
Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment 
in 1972, States negotiated an unprecedented number of 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) on a diverse 
array of subjects. One could speak of “treaty congestion” 
as they competed for space in covering related topics 
and sometimes needed extensive national administrative 
resources to implement them.11 Different secretariats for 
different agreements reviewed separate national reports 
for each agreement. Even where the required information 
for one overlapped with or was the same as that required 
for another, the reports were often prepared by different 
ministries within the national government. Frequently 
it took much less time to negotiate a new multilateral 
agreement than to gain the requisite number of States as 
Parties in order for the agreement to go into effect. 
States, legal scholars and others observed that many 
countries that were party to the agreements were often not 
in compliance with the obligations in the agreements.12 
Compliance for these purposes includes implementation, 
compliance with implementing measures, and enforcement 
of violations.13 Hence, international attention turned 
to strengthening compliance with the binding MEAs. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
developed and published two sets of guidelines: one on 
enhancing compliance with MEAs and the other on national 
enforcement of violations of national laws implementing 
these agreements.14
Since the year 2000, the rate of negotiation of new 
MEAs has slowed. While binding agreements continue 
to be important, in part because of their provisions for 
dispute resolution and for mandating compliance, other 
forms of international non-binding legal instruments have 
become ever more important, such as declarations, codes 
of conduct, international standards and guidelines.
Non-binding Legal Instruments
Non-binding legal instruments, or what is frequently 
referred to as “soft law”, have always had a significant place 
in international environmental law. By 1992, a list compiled 
of binding agreements and non-binding legal instruments 
concerned with the environment already included almost 
900 items.15 Non-binding legal instruments take many 
forms: declarations, charters, codes of conduct, resolutions, 
decisions of international inter-governmental organisations, 
and guidelines. They set forth norms that States and other 
actors are expected, although not required, to respect. In 
the past, they have frequently been a first step toward the 
later negotiation of binding agreements. For example, the 
UNEP London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information 
on Chemicals in International Trade, 1987 and amended 
in 1989, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and 
Use of Pesticides, 1985, laid the basis for a subsequent 
binding agreement: the Rotterdam Convention on the 
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade.16 
States negotiate non-binding legal instruments for 
many reasons. Sometimes they believe it would not be 
possible to reach a binding agreement on specific legal 
obligations, or to convince their Congress or Parliament 
to ratify such an agreement. Such instruments may also 
be useful in addressing new problems quickly. They may 
provide greater flexibility, so that States may alter strategies 
to address the problem more easily. The transaction costs 
of negotiating such instruments are usually considerably 
less. Especially as diverse new environmental problems 
have arisen, which may affect millions of people globally, 
non-binding legal instruments can send an important signal 
about how States and all of the actors are expected to 
behave, and can foster shared values.17 
There is considerable literature on the relationship 
between so-called “hard” and “soft” law, much of which 
suggests that the latter cannot replace the former and indeed 
that “soft” law needs support in “hard” law or a “hard” 
law framework to be effective. To highlight a few of the 
more recent of these works, Shaffer and Pollack provide an 
overview of the literature on both forms of law and conclude 
that most scholars view soft law as second best and only 
useful when hard law is not available. They suggest that 
States deliberately use soft law to undermine and change 
hard-law rules.18 Guzman and Meyer reject some previous 
explanations regarding the choice of soft law, including the 
claim that non-binding instruments are necessarily easier to 
conclude, and offer their own theories as to why States may 
indeed choose soft law over hard law.19 Brummer argues 
that, in the global financial sector, soft law is endemic and 
necessary.20 Two earlier studies on soft law, sponsored by 
the American Society of International Law, looked across 
the spectrum of international law to focus on specific cases 
of non-binding legal instruments and analyse the reasons 
for using them, compliance with them, and their impacts. 
The studies generally support the analysis offered earlier as 
to the reasons for using them and suggest that compliance 
with them may be as favourable under certain conditions 
as with binding agreements.21 
The development of international law in the Arctic 
illustrates the linkages between such so-called soft law 
and hard law, namely that non-binding legal instruments 
can be effective and may lead to the negotiation of binding 
instruments. When concern arose about the Arctic, the 
Arctic States signed the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy in 1991, and subsequently adopted the 1993 
Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in 
the Arctic.22 Although there were loud calls for a binding 
agreement at that time, the resulting instrument was non-
binding. In 1996, the seven Arctic States meeting in Ottawa 
signed a Declaration establishing the Arctic Council.23 
Again, a non-binding instrument established a formal inter-
governmental institution. In both cases, the form enabled 
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States to reach agreement and to move forward flexibly to 
address new challenges in the region. 
The Arctic Council created working groups to address 
various issues: the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, Sustainable 
Development Working Group, the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme, the Arctic Contaminants Action 
Programme and the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response Working group. Each group created special 
environmental protection programmes, such as the 
Circumpolar Protected Area Network. Working groups 
have also created non-binding legal instruments, such as 
the Arctic Oil and Gas Exploration Guidelines, guidelines 
on ship operations in the Arctic, and the Alta Declaration 
on environmental impact assessment in the Arctic.24 For 
the first time, on 15 May 2013, the Arctic countries signed 
a new binding agreement: the Agreement on Arctic Marine 
Oil Spill Preparedness and Response.25 
The Arctic example is 
especially useful because 
States operating under non-
binding legal instruments 
have developed and continue 
to initiate a plethora of new 
activities to address new 
challenges to the Arctic. 
Yet, they operate within a 
fragmented field of binding 
legal agreements that pertain to 
the Arctic: the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS),26 the 
International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships,27 and the Polar 
Bear Treaty.28 Five of the Arctic 
States – Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, the Russian Federation 
and the United States – met 
in 2008 and adopted the 
Ilulissat Declaration, which 
committed the countries to 
the existing international legal 
framework, particularly to 
UNCLOS provisions, and 
explicitly noted that they “see 
no need to develop a new 
comprehensive international 
legal regime to govern the 
Arctic Ocean”.29 This contrasts 
with Antarctica, where a comprehensive overall agreement 
governs the coverage area30 and preceded the development 
of non-binding legal instruments to address various facets 
of Antarctic problems. 
Voluntary Commitments by States
In international law, States have always possessed 
the authority to make voluntary commitments to address 
international issues. Each such commitment represents an 
exercise of national sovereignty. In practice, States have 
been reluctant to undertake such commitments in the 
absence of a commitment by other States to do the same. 
Hence, there has been the penchant for binding agreements 
or more recently, in the environmental area, for consensus 
on non-binding legal instruments. The efforts to address 
climate change and to promote environmental sustainability 
have led States to make voluntary commitments to control 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and to take measures to promote 
sustainability, even in the absence of a non-binding legal 
instrument. The commitments of States after the Climate 
Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009, 
illustrate this.
At the Conference, States negotiated but then declined 
to adopt the Copenhagen Accord, by which States would 
commit to reducing GHGs. They even declined to approve 
it as a Conference document, so that it had no legal 
status. Nonetheless, 141 countries have engaged with the 
Accord, by being either associated with it or supportive 
of it. These countries account for about 87 percent of 
global GHG emissions. Eighty-one States have submitted 
targets for reducing emissions, with 46 States committing 
to specific targets and timetables for reducing quantities 
of emissions, seven States committing to reductions from 
“business as usual”, two States committing to carbon 
intensity reduction, and 26 States submitting action plans 
designed to reduce GHG emissions or promote efficiency 
but without reduction targets.31 In a few instances, increased 
commitments were conditional upon other States also 
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making specific commitments.32 In the climate meetings 
since Copenhagen, States have not renounced these 
commitments. To the contrary, at the next climate meeting 
in Cancún, Mexico, they built upon the foundation laid in 
the Copenhagen Accord.33
In the case of climate, these voluntary commitments take 
place within a broader context of binding agreements: the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and, for many, the Kyoto Protocol.34 Indeed, States have 
agreed to negotiate a new binding agreement on climate by 
2015, to take effect in 2020 for the period beyond 2020.35 
Yet the voluntary commitments of Copenhagen represent 
the willingness of States to commit to measures even in the 
absence not only of a binding agreement, but of consensus 
on either a non-binding legal instrument or a formal 
conference document. This development may presage other 
voluntary commitments by States to address either other 
global environmental commons issues or environmental 
issues specific to an area, in which the consequences of 
not acting are seen as too severe to contemplate. 
Voluntary commitments can be especially useful in at 
least the following contexts: to press ahead in addressing a 
problem in the context of a general binding commitment, to 
enable differentiated commitments by States in addressing 
problems, or, importantly, to take actions when the dangers 
from inaction are too severe to wait for a formal consensus.
Non-binding Legal Instruments and 
Voluntary Commitments by Corporate and 
Non-governmental Organisations 
From an environmental perspective, the global 
increase in voluntary commitments by private industry is 
a potentially significant development. They may involve an 
international accord to which companies voluntarily agree 
to commit themselves. One of the most important examples 
is the United Nations Global Compact, which sets forth ten 
principles, three of which directly concern the environment. 
As of December 2013, the Compact had over 10,000 
signatories in more than 140 countries, which included the 
major companies. In other cases, the instrument involved 
was negotiated within the private sector.  
The globalisation of corporations and the development 
of international supply chains mean that national regulations 
are often inadequate and regulation at the international 
level is needed. These efforts by private industry are often 
linked to inter-governmental organisations, private-sector 
networks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or 
other participants in civil society. They take the form of 
standards, guidelines, codes of conduct, best practices, 
or similar documents. According to Vogel, “Private 
regulations that define standards for ‘responsible’ business 
practices now exist for virtually every global industry 
and internationally traded commodity, including forestry, 
fisheries, chemicals, computers, electronic equipment, 
apparel, rugs, coffee, cocoa, palm oil, diamonds, gold, 
toys, minerals, mining, energy, tourism, financial services 
and athletic equipment”.36 They can take different forms: 
principles, standards and certification, self-reporting 
of actions, or adoption of certain processes.37 By 2010, 
for example, more than 46,000 firms were certified 
as compliant with the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard for environmental 
management systems.38
NGOs have also developed standards with which 
producers are expected to comply and supply their own 
system of certification. Fair trade is one example of a well-
known NGO certification initiative, by which consumers 
can be informed as to whether a good has been certified as 
produced in accordance with specific standards. There are 
many fair-trade certified labels, with Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International (FLO) serving as an umbrella 
organisation and maintaining a register of updated 
standards.39 There are other important initiatives in forests 
and in fisheries.40 
The norms that these initiatives encapsulate do not 
constitute formal binding agreements, even by the private 
sector. Rather they are non-binding measures that have 
been formulated by a consensus consisting mostly of 
non-State actors, to which the private sector voluntarily 
adheres. Initiatives such as Fairtrade and those applying to 
fisheries and forests depend upon recognition by consumers 
in the marketplace. Conceptually, some of the voluntary 
private-sector initiatives share similarities with the non-
binding instruments that governments negotiate in that 
they are generally easier to negotiate and provide some 
flexibility in implementation, such as through certification 
arrangements. When industry self-regulates, the resulting 
initiatives are often attractive because they may avoid or 
pre-empt actions by governments. Since the instruments 
apply to many actors, they may also help to ensure a level 
playing field in trade relations, and to provide a basis for 
pressuring others to join or to comply. To date, however, 
participants in these initiatives often represent only a small 
fraction of the industry. 
Voluntary Commitments for Sustainability
Voluntary commitments are distinguished from other 
legal forms because they are not made pursuant to a 
consensus instrument to which the parties have agreed. 
They are not negotiated. They are generally independent 
of the commitments of other parties, though they may be 
in part conditioned upon similar actions by others, as in 
several commitments that States filed for the Copenhagen 
Accord. They generally provide for specific actions to be 
taken within a given time-frame. Ideally, they provide for 
measurable results.
A growing number of international initiatives solicit 
and publish voluntary commitments by States and non-
governmental entities to sustainable development. Most 
have their own registries. Several registries aggregate and 
publish commitments from multiple initiatives. The United 
Nations is the forum for at least three such initiatives: the UN 
Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform established 
as part of the 2012 Rio+20 preparations;41 the Sustainable 
Energy for All initiative established by the UN Secretary-
General as part of the 2012 Year of Sustainable Energy to 
solicit commitments by governments, businesses and civil 
society to take actions to secure global access to sustainable 
energy by 2030;42 and the UN Global Compact established 
in 2000 to solicit corporate commitments to take specific 
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actions to further UN goals.43 Other initiatives in the private 
sector relevant to environment include the Clinton Global 
Initiative,44 which invites commitments from governments 
and non-governmental bodies globally; the Corporate 
EcoForum,45 which is a membership organisation of large 
companies that publishes commitments to sustainability; 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council’s Cloud of 
Commitments,46 which provides an international registry 
that aggregates commitments from various initiatives. The 
sites generally do not yet gather data on compliance with 
the commitments made. 
One of the most significant initiatives of this kind is 
the UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. 
In the preparations for the Rio+20 Conference, several 
States and NGOs, including the US-based World Resources 
Institute, pushed for the creation of a compendium of 
commitments to promote sustainable development. As 
part of the conference, international organisations, NGOs 
and private corporations were invited to make voluntary 
commitments to take actions to achieve sustainable 
development. More than 700 commitments were collected 
during the Conference, which were listed in a new online 
registry, the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Knowledge Platform.47 
The final Report from the Conference, “The Future We 
Want”, explicitly endorsed this initiative in paragraph 283: 
We welcome the commitments voluntarily entered 
into at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development and throughout 2012 by all stakeholders 
and their networks to implement concrete policies, 
plans, programmes, projects and actions to promote 
sustainable development and poverty eradication. 
We invite the Secretary-General to compile these 
commitments and facilitate access to other registries 
that have compiled commitments, in an Internet-based 
registry. The registry should make information about 
the commitments fully transparent and accessible to the 
public, and it should be periodically updated.48 
The UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform 
responds to this mandate. The Platform continues to open to 
voluntary commitments that meet the criteria “to announce 
and achieve concrete time-bound deliverables that advance 
sustainable development”. As of early 2013, the Platform 
listed 1374 commitments, with an estimated worth of more 
than US$ 637 million. This includes 36 commitments by 
governments and 128 commitments by major groups of 
actors in climate change and energy.49 The Table below lists 
the voluntary, non-negotiated commitments by countries 
under Rio+20 and associated initiatives related to climate 
and energy. 
Table 1. Climate-change-related voluntary commitments by countries under international platforms
Country Platform Description
Antigua and 
Barbuda
Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2030, achieve 15% renewable energy
Barbados Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2029, achieve 22% electricity energy-efficiency savings relative to “business 
as usual” (BAU), and 29% of all electricity from renewable sources
Cape Verde Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2020, reduce importation of electricity fuel by 30%, and reduce GHG 
emissions by 35%; by 2030, become 0% emitting country, and achieve 2% 
penetration rate of electric vehicles
China Rio+20 US$ 31.7 million for project to help small island States, least developed 
countries, and African countries with climate change
Cook Islands Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2015, 50% renewable energy; by 2020, 100% renewable energy
Dominica Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2020, become carbon-negative by exporting renewable energy, and increase 
renewable energy generation to 100%
Fiji Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2015, utilisation of biofuels in transport sector
Ghana Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, achieve 10% renewable energy
Grenada Rio+20 By 2020, reduce GHG emissions by 20% below BAU (Barbados Declaration); 
by 2030, become 100% green in electricity and transport sectors
Guyana Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2030, develop hydropower to provide 90% of electricity
Liechtenstein Rio+20 By 2020, increase share of sustainable energy from 8% to 20%, reduce CO2 emissions by 20% (same as Copenhagen Commitment), and reduce energy 
consumption by 20%
Environmental Policy and Law, 44/1-2 (2014)88
0378-777X/13/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press
in behaviour to meet the growing need for a globally 
sustainable economy. But they do have the potential to 
leverage consumer opinion to encourage competitors and 
others to make similar commitments. Of course, for this 
to happen, the public must know about the commitments 
and be willing to respond accordingly. 
Voluntary Commitments in a Kaleidoscopic 
World
T h e  a b o v e  a n a l y s i s  a d d r e s s e d  v o l u n t a r y 
commitments by major actors in the public and private 
sectors. In a kaleidoscopic world, individuals, ad hoc 
coalitions, informal groups, transient networks, and 
other such actors become important. Their actions 
may often be characterised as bottom-up. They may 
respond to both immediate issues, which may emerge 
and change rapidly, and to longer-term challenges. 
And each of them may alter their focus in response to 
changing conditions. 
Voluntary commitments could have an important role 
in bottom-up empowerment. They produce “buy-in” by 
Country Platform Description
Maldives Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2020, achieve carbon neutrality in energy sector (same as Copenhagen 
Commitment)
Marshall 
Islands
Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2020, achieve 20% efficiency improvement in transportation sector fuel use, 
20% of energy through indigenous renewable resources, and 40% reduction in 
CO2 emissions below 2009 levels (same as Copenhagen Commitment)
Mauritius Rio+20 By 2025, increase share of renewable energy to 35% (Barbados Declaration); 
by 2020, increase forest tree cover, implement reforestation programme, and 
extend surveillance of protected areas by 80%
Nauru Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2015, achieve 50% of energy provided by alternative sources; by 2025, viable 
power-generating capacity including alternative renewable energy sources
Samoa Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2030, increase contribution of renewable energy to total energy by 20%
Seychelles Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2030, 15% of energy supply from renewable energy
Solomon 
Islands
Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2030, replace current use of imported fossil fuel for electricity by 100%
St Lucia Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2020, reduce public-sector electricity consumption by 20%, and increase 
contribution of renewable energy by 20%
St Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines
Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2012, reduce projected electricity generation by 5%; by 2015, deliver 30% of 
electricity output from renewable sources; by 2020, reduce projected electricity 
generation by 15%, and deliver 60% of electricity output from renewable sources
Timor-Leste Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2020, 50% of power generation from renewable energy
Tonga Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2020, improve efficiency of electricity by 18%, and include 50% renewable 
energy in energy transformation sector
Tuvalu Rio+20 (Barbados 
Declaration)
By 2020, power generation 100% from renewable energy
Prepared by Lydia Slobodian. Source: United Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, at http://sustain-
abledevelopment.un.org.
Major corporations have also made commitments 
under the various voluntary initiatives referenced above. 
These may be more significant than the commitments 
made by States. Some of the commitments are from 
large multinational corporations, whose revenues eclipse 
the economies of some countries. They are in the form 
of targets and timetables. Microsoft, for example, has 
committed to achieve net zero-carbon emissions by 2013. 
The Bank of America has committed US$ 50 billion over 
the next 10 years to financing activities that advance a low-
carbon economy. Bridgestone has committed to securing 
100 percent of its materials from sustainable sources by 
2030. Dell has committed to reducing its GHG emissions 
by 40 percent by 2015. SABMiller has committed to 
reducing fossil fuel emissions from on-site energy use by 
50 percent per hectolitre of lager produced by 2020, relative 
to 2008 levels. See the Annex to this article, for a list of 
major voluntary commitments by corporations related to 
climate and energy. 
While these commitments are in themselves significant, 
they certainly are not enough to effect a sufficient change 
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those who make them. If we are to address the momentous 
environmental issues confronting us locally and globally, 
we need to mobilise everyone to engage in sustainable 
development and living patterns. Voluntary commitments 
are useful because they do not depend on negotiated 
outcomes, can be initiated quickly (at least in theory), and 
can be adapted to local practices and culture. They give 
actors flexibility, because the party making the commitment 
is responsible for specifying its content. Such actions 
should be able to draw upon best practices and to showcase 
best practices to facilitate learning. Voluntary commitments 
can inform others and build a favourable reputation for 
those taking them. They can build momentum toward 
broader efforts to live sustainably. They can provide space 
for cooperative efforts. Such efforts complement, but are 
not a substitute for, commitments by States and major 
private-sector actors. 
Concerns about Voluntary Commitments
While voluntary commitments are becoming an 
important feature in the environmental-law landscape, 
they also raise significant issues. Such issues will increase 
as more actors in the kaleidoscopic world voluntarily take 
initiatives and other actions relevant to environmental 
law. Some environmental problems, especially global 
ones like climate change or marine pollution, require 
that States work together to address them and that they 
agree upon what needs to be done. They also require that 
other actors behave in certain ways. While voluntary 
commitments may be an important, perhaps necessary, 
step in the face of inaction, they cannot be regarded as a 
substitute for negotiated norms and requirements. Indeed 
they may, in the long run, depend upon the latter for their 
effectiveness. 
Voluntary commitments in the private sector rest in 
large measure upon the premise that they enhance the 
reputation of those making them, although there is little 
evidence that such commitments have been reflected in 
sales or share prices.50 Scholarly literature on corporate 
compliance with regulations also suggests that reputation 
is an important factor in motivating compliance.51 
The concern with reputation can be used to encourage 
commitments as well as to guard against “green wash” in 
the commitments.
One of the most significant problems with voluntary 
commitments made in the absence of a negotiated 
consensus on the obligation is that they may not be 
enunciated in formats that are compatible with each other 
or comparable. The qualitative data, for example, may 
not be standardised or sufficiently comparable for civil 
society, investors and others to use in assessing overall 
advancement toward sustainability. 
This leads to the issue of monitoring. Since there may be 
hundreds or thousands of commitments in different formats 
and with different content, it will be challenging to monitor 
compliance with each commitment. This will be the case, 
even if there is full transparency of commitments and of 
reporting on progress in meeting them. Developments in 
information technology may improve this situation in the 
future. 
Voluminous voluntary commitments also raise 
difficult issues of accountability. The traditional view 
of accountability is that the party responsible for 
carrying out an obligation must be held to account if it 
is not carried out. But this requires tracking an actor’s 
compliance with its commitment and being able to impose 
consequences for not meeting the commitment. None of 
the international registries track compliance with voluntary 
commitments. Especially in a kaleidoscopic world where 
many commitments may not be centrally registered, 
accountability can be difficult, and can potentially involve 
high transaction costs. 
Perhaps most of all, the growing use of voluntary 
commitments points to the need for platforms that 
compile and aggregate individual commitments and 
that make the commitments readily accessible online. 
Such platforms can be formed at the local, regional and 
international levels, and by civil society organisations as 
well as governments. A few integrating platforms should 
facilitate our ability to assess the comprehensiveness of 
voluntary commitments, to identify significant gaps, and 
to encourage cooperation. They also need to provide space 
for those making the commitments to report regularly on 
their implementation of them, so that it may be possible 
to track compliance.
The Importance of Common Values
All of the above rests on having a set of common 
values, from which commitments can emerge and 
desirable behaviour can be derived. While international 
environmental agreements traditionally reflected such 
values and articulated shared commitments, which 
penetrated hierarchically downward within States for 
implementation; in the kaleidoscopic world, the common 
values and shared commitments will also need to flourish 
from the bottom up. Since individuals, ad hoc coalitions, 
and informal or transient groups of actors will increasingly 
be able to influence the development and implementation of 
international environmental law, common values become 
essential. Otherwise, voluntary commitments can be a fig 
leaf covering inaction, or can be drastically insufficient to 
achieve a sustainable world. 
One of the significant features of our information 
technology revolution is that individuals increasingly 
communicate globally. Indeed, young people are growing 
up with an outlook that assumes they can communicate with 
others elsewhere. This emerging global linkage provides an 
avenue for fostering shared values about the environment 
and sustainable development. It could provide a means 
for fostering bottom-up commitments and actions that 
address our environmental problems and foster sustainable 
development. 
For international environmental law, the above analysis 
suggests that we need to broaden the range of relevant actors 
beyond States to encompass those coming to prominence 
in the kaleidoscopic world and to consider the modes of 
communication. It also suggests that we should take an 
expansive view of the range of relevant instruments so as 
to include not only the traditional binding and non-binding 
legal instruments but also the voluntary commitments that 
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sensitive to conserve our environment for present and 
future generations. 
The author thanks Lydia Slobodian for research 
assistance.
all actors may increasingly make and rely upon. Binding 
multilateral agreements continue to be important, and States 
should continue to pursue them, but they are insufficient 
to address our growing and complex environmental issues 
effectively. For that, we will need everyone’s assistance. 
This requires developing common values that are culturally 
Annex 
Climate-change-related voluntary commitments by corporations under international platforms
Committer Platform Description
Accenture Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2013, support UN Sustainable Energy for All programme office, and 
establish Accenture Development Partnership to support energy access
Acumen Fund, 
Inc.
Clinton Global 
Initiative
Invest US$ 3 million in companies providing renewable energy to poor
Agritech Faso Sustainable Energy 
for All
Construct biomass-to-energy power plant, including five units of 1 MW each
Aid Green, Ltd Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2016, increase carbon-credit-related business to 20% of gross sales
Applied 
Materials, Inc.
Clinton Global 
Initiative
Fund participation of 18 energy entrepreneurs at Santa Clara University training 
programme over next three years
ArcelorMittal Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions by 8% per tonne of steel produced relative to 2007
ARM Holdings Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2013, expand engineering personnel by 10% to research energy-efficient 
microprocessors, graphics processors, etc., and create collaborative initiatives 
to improve energy efficiency
Artron 
Enterprise 
Commitments
China Going Green Adopt methods to reduce energy consumption and emissions, and guarantee 
materials comply with FSC/COC standards
Asea Brown 
Boveri Limited 
(ABB)
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, ensure energy and resource efficiency of ABB operations improves 
by 2.5% per year
Banco 
Santander
Global Compact By 2014, increase purchase of renewable energy from 2.45 million kWh to 3.86 
million kWh; by 2013, reduce GHG emissions and energy consumption by 7.5%
Bank of 
America
Sustainable Energy 
for All
Commit US$ 50 billion over next 10 years to finance activities that advance 
the low-carbon economy
BASF SE Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, reduce GHG emissions per metric ton of sales product by 40% relative 
to 2002, and improve energy efficiency in production by 35% relative to 2002
Bayer AG Sustainable Energy 
for All
Improve energy efficiency and develop tools and strategies for sustainable 
buildings
Beijing 
Vantone Real 
Estate
China Going Green Ensure residential projects comply with Green Product standard and all 
commercial projects with Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) standards; allocate 0.5% of profits to environmental product 
development; five-year plan to reduce carbon emissions by 2.45 million tons
BMW Group Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, reduce resource consumption per vehicle by 45% (relative to 2006), 
and reduce product CO2 emissions by 50% (relative to 1995)
Bridgestone Global Compact 100% sustainable materials by 2030
Brisa Auto-
Estradas de 
Portugal, S.A.
Global Compact By 2012, decrease electricity consumption by 10% (relative to 2009), decrease 
fuel consumption by 3%, decrease water consumption by 3%, decrease waste 
generation by 3%, and decrease GHG emissions by 6%
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Committer Platform Description
Cementos 
Argos S.A.
Global Compact By 2022, reduce CO2 emissions per ton by 20%, and substitute 7.5% of fossil fuels with alternative fuels
China 
Petroleum 
and Chemical 
Corporation
Global Compact By 2015, reduce SO2 emissions by 12%, COD by 12%, NHx by 10%, and NOx by 10%
China Vanke China Going Green By end of 2012, achieve garbage reduction of 30–40%; new residential buildings 
use 87% wood, 20% less energy, 63% lower water costs, green-star standards, 
and FSC-certified wood
Citigroup Clinton Global 
Initiative
Develop and offer energy-efficiency finance solutions
CLP Holdings 
Limited
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, achieve 20% renewable energy, 30% non-carbon-emitting energy, 
reduce carbon intensity of generating portfolio to 0.6kg CO2/kWh from 0.84 CO2/kWh in 2007 (28% reduction); by 2035, reduce carbon intensity of generating portfolio to 0.45 kg CO2/kWh (45% reduction); by 2050, reduce carbon intensity of generating portfolio to 0.2 kg CO2/kWh (75% reduction)
d.light design Sustainable Energy 
for All
Expand production and distribution of solar lamps
Dell Global Compact By 2015, reduce GHG emissions by 40%, and increase cumulative take-back 
volume to 1 billion pounds
Deloitte LLP Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2021, reduce GHGs by 35% per full-time equivalent (FTE) relative to 2011
Det Norske 
Veritas
Global Compact By 2012, reinvest 6% of revenue in development of sustainable technology 
including low carbon
DGB Financial 
Group
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions by 10% relative to 2008, and reduce energy consumption by 1% every year
Disney Corporate 
EcoForum
By 2015, fund 6,000 acres of reforestation including one project that results in 
enhancing carbon sequestration
Dupont Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, reduce non-renewable energy use by 10% per dollar revenue relative 
to 2010; by 2015, reduce by 3%; by 2015, increase revenue from products that 
reduce GHGs or increase energy efficiency by US$ 2 billion
Eaton 
Corporation
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, reduce water used by 20% relative to 2010, and reduce GHG emissions 
by 25% relative to 2012
Ecodes Rio+20 Reduce CO2 emissions per capita by 20% relative to 2010
Embraco Sustainable Energy 
for All
Invest 3% of revenue in research in increasing energy-efficiency levels in 
refrigerator compressors
EnerNOC Clinton Global 
Initiative
Adopt Green Button standard to provide consumers with information about 
their energy use
Eni Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, reduce GHG emissions per k of hydrocarbon production by 40% 
compared to 2010
Entergy Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions from power plants and purchases to 20% below 2000 levels
Eskom 
Holdings
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2016, increase thermal plant efficiency by 150 MW; by 2017, reduce internal 
energy consumption by 15% 
Femsa Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2013, use renewable energy for 85% of energy needs of Mexican operations 
(based on size of operations in 2010)
GDF SUEZ Global Compact By 2017, increase activities in energy efficiency by 40%; by 2015, increase 
renewable energy capacity by 50%; by 2015, develop biodiversity action plan 
at each sensitive site in the European Union (EU)
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Committer Platform Description
Global 
Compact 
Network 
Pakistan
Global Compact By 2017, achieve 20% reduction in energy use, and compliance with Euro 2 
low-emission standards in vehicles
Green 
Mountain 
College
Clinton Global 
Initiative
By 2013, reduce carbon footprint by 66% relative to 2007 levels
Henkel AG, 
Co. KGAA
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2030, triple value created for footprint; by 2015, reduce energy per 
production unit by 15%, reduce water per production unit by 15%, and increase 
sales per production unit by 10%
Himin Solar China Going Green Achieve 40% utilisation rate of renewable energy, 30% reduction of carbon 
emissions, 90% utilisation rate of rain water, 70% sewage recycling, 80% 
recycling of engineering waste, and 80% recycling of construction waste
Hitachi Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2025, help reduce CO2 emissions by 100 million tons relative to 2005 through Hitachi products and services
Holcim Group Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, reduce average specific net CO2 emissions (kgCO2/tonne cementitious materials) by 25% relative to 1990
Infosys Sustainable Energy 
for All
Reduce consumption by 50%, source 100% of electricity from renewables, 
and become carbon neutral
ItalCementi 
Group
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, have 10% of thermal energy demand for cement production from 
alternative fuels and biomass
ITC Limited Global Compact By 2017, retain status as carbon-positive, water-positive despite growth in 
business
Johnson 
Controls
Clinton Global 
Initiative
Adopt Green Button standard to provide consumers with information about 
their energy use
KPMG 
International
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, seek to reduce GHG emissions per FTE by 15% (relative to 2010)
Lafarge Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, use 50% alternative fuels in all entities Lafarge controls, reduce CO2 emissions by 33% (relative to 1990 levels), and, by 2015, contribute to 500 
energy-efficient construction projects
Marriott 
International
Corporate 
EcoForum
In Amazon’s Juma Basin, achieve 20% reduction in energy and water 
consumption by 2020; US$ 500,000 in 2012
Marriott; OPIC Rio+20 Commit US$ 2,000,000 to build hotels meeting environmental standards such 
as LEED
Masdar Sustainable Energy 
for All
Install 500kWp photovoltaic plant in Tonga by 2013
MeadWestvaco Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, reduce use of fossil fuels by 25%
Metsä Group Global Compact By 2020, source all wood from sustainably managed forests, reduce fossil 
CO2 emissions in production by 30%, and improve energy efficiency by 10%
Microsoft Sustainable Energy 
for All
Achieve net zero-carbon emissions by 2013
Mitsubishi 
Chemical 
Holdings 
Corporation
Global Compact By 2015, reduce GHGs by 17% in Japan from 2005
National 
Confederation 
of Hellenic 
Commerce
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2014, achieve 7% reduction in operational carbon footprint across 700 SMEs 
of the retail sector (relative to 2012)
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Committer Platform Description
National 
Ready Mixed 
Concrete 
Association
2030 Challenge for 
Products
Manufacture products that meet carbon footprint limits of 30% below product 
average in 2014, 35% in 2015, 40% in 2020, 45% in 2025 and 50% in 2030
Nike, Inc. Sustainable Energy 
for All
Achieve 20% reduction in CO2 emissions per unit from FY11 levels through FY15
Nokero 
International 
Ltd
Sustainable Energy 
for All
Provide universal access to solar energy in the Navajo Nation
Osaka Gas Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2014, improve environmental management efficiency in gas business by 
26% over 2009 levels
Philips Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, improve energy efficiency of product and solutions portfolio by 50% 
(relative to 2009)
Polarstem Global Compact From 2012, offer free or reduced rate communications services for sustainable 
projects and organisations within Switzerland equalling 10% of annual turnover
Procter and 
Gamble
Global Compact By 2020, replace 25% of petroleum-based materials with renewable materials 
(relative to 2010), carry out 70% of washing machine loads using cold water, 
and achieve 20% packaging reduction per consumer
Quanta 
Computer
China Going Green Incorporate carbon management into long-term strategy
Renault, 
Nissan
Global Compact By 2016, have 1.5 million electric vehicles on roads; by 2012, have five different 
electric vehicles available to consumers
Rezidor Hotel 
Group
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2016, reduce energy consumption in all hotels by 25%
Rockefeller 
Foundation
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2014, commit to engage with initiatives to expand energy provision in 
rural India: awarded US$ 6.3 million, may award an additional US$ 1 million
SABMiller Global Compact By 2020, reduce fossil fuel emissions from on-site energy use by 50% per 
hectolitre of lager produced relative to 2008
SCA Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and electricity and heating by 20% relative to 2005, triple production of biofuels from forests, and increase 
production of wind power to 5 Twh
Schneider 
Electric
Sustainable Energy 
for All
Increase number of people who receive Energy Savings Education
Siemens Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2014, grow externally verified Environmental Portfolio from EU 29.9 
billion to EU 40 billion 
Skanska AB Sustainable Energy 
for All
In 2015, 50% of all commercial development projects started in Nordic markets 
will meet “Deep Green” targets: 0 net use of primary energy, near 0 carbon 
in construction, 0 unsustainable materials, and 0 net water use for buildings
SKF Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2016, reduce total annual energy use by 5% below 2006 levels, require 
that 100% of suppliers are certified under Energy Management Standard ISO 
50001, reduce CO2 emissions/tonne-km for all transport by 30% below 2011 levels, and increase revenue from carbon-reducing/energy-saving portfolio to 
10 billion SEK
Sompo Japan 
Insurance Inc.
Global Compact By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions by 40.5%; by 2050, reduce CO2 emissions by 56%
Statoil ASA Global Compact By 2020, reduce gas flaring to two tons of gas flared per 1000 tons of 
hydrocarbons produced
Telefonica Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, reduce energy consumption in networks per equivalent access by 
30% (relative to 2007)
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Committer Platform Description
Total Sustainable Energy 
for All
Provide access to solar lamps and kits for five million low-income people by 
2015
Toyola Energy 
Limited 
(Ghana)
Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, sell three million energy-efficient cooking stoves and 30,000 solar 
lanterns and home systems to poor households in sub-Saharan Africa
Unilever Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2020, halve the environmental footprint of making and use of products
University of 
Texas at Austin
Clinton Global 
Initiative
Pursue LEED certification on all new buildings
Vestas Sustainable Energy 
for All
By 2015, procure 100% renewable electricity and 55% renewable energy
Xerox Global Compact By 2013, develop carbon management practices with different jurisdictions 
in Indonesia; by 2014, identify priority opportunities for emissions reduction
Prepared by Lydia Slobodian.
Sources: Clinton Global Initiative, http://www.clintonglobalinitiative.org; Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Cloud of Commitments, http://www.cloudofcommitments.org; United Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge 
Platform, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org; UN Business, http://business.un.org/en/browse/commitments; Corporate 
EcoForum and The Nature Conservancy, The New Business Imperative: Valuing Natural Capital (2012), available at http://
corporateecoforum.com/valuingnaturalcapital/; and Sustainable Energy for All, http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org.
Notes
1  Crutzen, P.J. and Stoermer, E.F. 2000. “The ‘Anthropocene’”. Global Change 
Newsletter: International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme 41: 17–18.
2  The author thanks Keir Lamont, Georgetown Law, for research assistance 
with social media data.
3  “Quarterly Earnings Slides: Q1 2013”. Facebook, 1 May 2013, at http://files.
shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-NJ5DZ/2585583359x0x659143/b4c0beda-
da0a-4f8e-9735-9852ef08adb1/FB_Q113_InvestorDeck_FINAL.pdf. 
4  Kolyandr, A. 2012. “Russian Social Network Cancels IPO after Facebook 
Woes”. The Wall Street Journal, 29 May 2012, at http://blogs.wsj.com/
emergingeurope/2012/05/29/russian-social-network-cancels-ipo-after-facebook-
woes/.
5  Twitter Statistics, Statistic Brain Research Institute, 7 May 2013, at http://
www.statisticbrain.com/twitter-statistics/.
6  Statistics, Youtube, at http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html.
7  See www.tumblr.com, 7 June 2013; http://en.wordpress.com/stats/, 7 June 
2013; www.livejournal.com, 7 June 2013. Tumblr reported 124 million blogs by 
July 2013, and WordPress reported 68 million blogs viewed by over 359 million 
unique monthly users by July 2013. The estimates of daily traffic to blog-hosting 
sites came from Bizinformation.com.
8  “Highlights on Telecom Subscription Data as on 30th April 2013”. 
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 3 July 2013, at http://www.trai.gov.in/
WriteReadData/PressRealease/Document/PR-TSD-03JULY2013.pdf.
9  “The Transformational Use of Information and Communication Technologies 
in Africa”. World Bank and the African Development Bank with the support 
of the African Union, 10 December 2012, at http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONANDTECHNOLOGIES/
Resources/282822-1346223280837/Summary.pdf.
10  Lüfkens, M. 2012. “Twiplomacy Study 2012”. Burson-Marsteller, 26 July 
2012, at www.twiplomacy.com/twiplomacy-study-2012/.
11  Brown Weiss, E. 1993. “International Environmental Law: Contemporary 
Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order”. Georgetown Law Journal 81(3): 
675–710.
12  See, e.g., Brown Weiss, E. and Jacobson, H.K. (Eds) 1998. Engaging 
Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press; Chayes, A. and Chayes, A. 1995. The New Sovereignty: 
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press; Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.-T. and Wolfrum, R. (Eds) 2006. Ensuring 
Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Dialogue between 
Practitioners and Academia. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.
13  Brown Weiss and Jacobson, ibid.
14  See also UNEP. 2006. Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Nairobi: UNEP. The Manual complements 
the Guidelines by providing specific examples from around the world on how 
governments, NGOs, the private sector, and other institutions have used the various 
approaches set forth in the Guidelines.
15  Brown Weiss, E., Szasz, P. and Magraw, D. 1992. International Environmental 
Law: Basic Instruments and References. New York: Transnational Publishers Inc.
16  Adopted and opened for signature on 10 September 1998, UNEP/FAO/PIC/
INC.5/3, Appendix I; 2244 UNTS 337. 
17  Brown Weiss, E. 1997. International Compliance with Nonbinding Accords. 
ASIL Studies in Transnational Law No. 29. Washington DC: American Society of 
International Law.
18  Schaffer, G. and Pollack, M. 2010. “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance”. Minnesota Law 
Review 94: 706–799.
19  Guzman, A. and Meter, T. 2010. “International Soft Law”. Journal of Legal 
Analysis 2: 171.
20  Brummer, C. 2012. Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making 
in the 21st Century. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
21  Shelton, D. (Ed.) 2000. Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-
binding Norms in the International Legal System. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press; Brown Weiss, supra, note 17.
22  Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic, 16 
September 1993, reprinted in Yearbook International Environmental Law 4: 687; 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 14 June 1991, reprinted in 30 ILM 1624 
(1991).
23  Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 19 September 
1996, reprinted in 15 ILM 1382 (1996).
24  The recent Kiruna Declaration established a Task Force “to develop 
arrangements on actions to achieve enhanced black carbon and methane emission 
reductions in the Arctic”. Kiruna Declaration, 15 May 2003, at http://www.arctic-
council.org.
25  Agreement on Arctic Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response, 15 May 
2013, at http://www.Arctic-council.org. The Agreement provides for provisional 
application pending the receipt of necessary documents from member States to 
become party. 
26  10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, reprinted in 21 ILM 1261 (1982).
27  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 
12 May 1943, TIAS 4900.
28  Oslo Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, 15 November 1973, 27 
UST 3918, TIAS 8409.
29  The Ilulissat Declaration, 28 May 2008 (meeting of representatives of the 
five coastal States bordering the Arctic Ocean, in Ilulissat, Greenland). 
30  Antarctic Treaty, 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71, TIAS 4780.
31  The country submissions are available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/
copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php; see also US Climate Action Network, at 
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/copenhagen-accord-commitments.
32  Ibid. Examples include Australia, the EU and Norway. European Commission, 
28 Jan 2010 “Expression of willingness to be associated with the Copenhagen 
Accord and QERTs for 2020”, at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/
copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/europeanunioncphaccord_app1.pdf.
33  The Cancún Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
Environmental Policy and Law, 44/1-2 (2014) 95
0378-777X/13/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf.
34  UNFCCC, 21 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (1992); and Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 10 December 1997, 
2303 UNTS 162 (1997).
35  Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/
cop17/eng/09a01.pdf.
36  Vogel, D. 2010. “The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct”. 
Business & Society 49: 68–87, at 71–72.
37  Gilbert, D.U., Rasche, A. and Waddock, S. 2011. “Accountability in a Global 
Economy: The Emergence of International Accountability Standards”. Business 
Ethics Quarterly 21(1): 23–44.
38  Supra, note 36. 
39  See e.g., http://www.fair-trade-hub.com/fair-trade-certification.html.
40  See e.g., Forest Stewardship Council, Principles and Criteria for Forest 
Stewardship, at https://ic.fsc.org/principles-and-criteria.34.htm; and Marine 
Stewardship Council Sustainable Fisheries Standards, at http://www.msc.org/
documents/.
41  See http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/.
42  See http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org/.
43  See http://business.un.org.
44  See http://www.clintonglobalinitiative.org.
45  See http://www.corporateecoforum.com/.
46  See http://www.cloudofcommitments.org/commitments/. The National 
Resources Defense Council is pursuing further development of this initiative.
47  Supra, note 41.
48  “The Future We Want”, Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20–22 June 2012, UN Doc. A/
CONF.216/16, Resolution 1: Annex, para. 283.
49  “Sustainable development in action”. United Nations Sustainable 
Development Knowledge Platform, at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.
php?menu=1348.
50  Supra, note 36. Vogel argues that corporations agree to industry regulation 
to protect their reputations. For analysis of the role of reputation in corporate 
social responsibility, see, e.g., Sacconi, L., Blair, M., Freeman, E. and Vercelli, A. 
(Eds) 2011. Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
51  See e.g., Blair, M. 1994. Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate 
Governance for the Twenty-First Century (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
Press), for a classic work on corporate behaviour.
State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts:  
Comments on Some ILC Articles
by Julio Barboza*
In 2001, after forty years of work, the International 
Law Commission (ILC) produced excellent articles on 
the international responsibility of States (herein, the 
“ILC Articles”).1 These Articles were annexed to UN 
General Assembly Resolution 56/83. The following paper 
comments on Articles 1 and 2 and on others of the ILC 
Articles as related to them. It is meant to be a contribution 
from a former member of the Commission to the on-going 
process of assimilation of the results of the ILC Articles 
project into international practice. 
Articles 1 and 2 should be examined together. 
Other articles follow lines originated in the texts of 
these two. Article 1 is a key, and sets a basic principle: 
“every internationally wrongful act of a State entails 
the international responsibility of that State”. Article 2 
develops the all-important concept of “wrongful act” of 
the State. Specifically, paragraph (a) defines an “act of the 
State” and (b) sets out when an act of the State is “wrong”.
Classically, commentators note the omission of any 
reference to “injury” or “damage” in the combined text 
of Articles 1 and 2. That omission seems to indicate that 
the ILC has taken sides in the old debate about whether 
injury is necessary to give rise to responsibility. Around 
the idea of continuing violation of an obligation (Article 
14.2), other notions are grouped, including continued duty 
of performance (Article 29) and cessation (Article 30). The 
relationship between these three concepts is governed by an 
internal logic seemingly at odds with the normal operation 
of the responsibility mechanism.
The Mechanism of Responsibility 
Referring to the normal operation of the responsibility 
mechanism, i.e., the sequence from breach of primary 
obligation to legal consequences, the mechanism is simple: 
once the primary obligation is breached, it is forthwith 
replaced by the secondary obligation (of reparation) and so 
extinguished. But once extinguished it cannot be violated 
any more, which undercuts the notion of continuing 
violation. On the other hand, in a continuing violation, 
the secondary obligations cannot enter into play until the 
damage has been quantified, i.e., until the unlawful conduct 
stops and consequently the damage to the injured State has 
ceased and reparation, perhaps, been established.
The existence of continuing violations having already 
been included in the ILC Articles at Article 14, it seemed 
necessary that the primary obligation would need to remain 
in force, if it were to continue being breached. In fact, 
both the notions of continued duty of performance and 
of cessation of violation are dependent on the concept of 
continuing violation.
Thus, the mechanism of responsibility cannot work 
in its usual way, i.e., by the immediate operation of the 
obligation to make reparation. Cessation provides a new 
starting point from which secondary obligations can enter 
into play. Although different, however, the concepts of 
continued duty of performance and cessation were given 
the role of guardians of the sanctity of international 
obligations. However, given that the Articles perceive 
an identity between the roles played by cessation and 
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